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THE SPANISH WAGE CURVE:
EVIDENCE FROM THE 1990-91 EPF SURVEY
Abstract:
The analysis of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) for different countries has established the
existence of an inverse relationship between individual wages and local unemployment.
Moreover, the coefficient for the elasticity between both variables has proved to be very close to
–0.1 across areas and industries and over time. This relationship is known as the wage curve.
The objective of the paper is to explore the existence of a wage curve for Spain. With this aim,
we use individual data from the Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (Family Budgets Survey)
for the year 1990-1991 to quantify the relationship between individual wages and local
unemployment rates. The results show the existence of a wage curve with an elasticity of –0.06.
This value is lower than in countries with more flexible labour markets and lower
unemployment rates. However, the elasticity is higher when specific labour markets by gender
and age are considered.1
1. Introduction
In an influential work, Blanchflower and Oswald (1990, 1994) postulate the existence of
a downward sloping relationship between individual wages and local unemployment
rates. This relationship, known as wage curve, has proved to be some kind of empirical
law. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) present evidence on wage curves for several
countries (including the United States, Britain, Canada, South Korea, Austria, Italy,
Holland, Switzerland, Norway, Ireland, Australia and Germany), for different time
periods, using different data sets and different definitions of the considered variables
(annual earnings, monthly earnings or wage per hour and various levels of
disaggregation of the unemployment level). Another interesting feature of this curve is
that the elasticity of wages to unemployment is close to –0.1.
Other authors have also provided evidence of the existence of a wage curve for
countries not considered in the Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) analysis: Groot et al.
(1992) for the Netherlands, Janssens and Konings (1998) for Belgium; Pannenberg and
Schwarze (1998) for East Germany and Hoddinot (1996) for Côte d’Ivoire, among
others.
This paper investigates whether the Spanish labour market exhibits a wage curve. There
are two reasons why such an analysis is of interest. First, to our knowledge, the
evidence for the Spanish case is very scarce
1. Sanromá and Ramos (1999) include the
regional unemployment rate as an explanatory variable in an augmented Mincer
equation –although with a different purpose to the one considered in this paper
2- finding
a negative and significant relationship with a coefficient close to –0.1. Second, the
peculiarities of the Spanish labour market -with a practically non-existent regional
mobility, very high and persistent unemployment rates and a very limited wage
flexibility- make the analysis especially relevant.
The structure of the paper is as follows: first, in the next section, the usual specification
for the wage curve is presented and different theoretical explanations of this empirical
law are considered; in the third section, the data used for the empirical analysis are
presented; and, next, the empirical results are shown; the paper ends summarising the
main findings.2
2. The wage curve: theoretical explanations and empirical evidence
As it has been mentioned in the previous section, the wage curve is a negative sloped
relationship between individual wages and regional unemployment. This relationship
has proved to be an empirical regularity and different theoretical explanations have been
proposed to explain it. The usual empirical specification of the wage curve is that of an
augmented Mincer equation where the endogenous variable is the individual wage and
explanatory variables include the unemployment rate apart from the usual individual
and job characteristics variables. When this kind of equations are econometrically
estimated using data sets for different countries and time periods, the coefficient
associated to unemployment is significant, negative and close to –0.1.
However, from a theoretical point view, the neoclassical theory predicts that wages will
reach higher levels in the areas of higher unemployment, thereby balancing the risk of
becoming unemployed, or in a similar way, equalling the flow of income from labour -
or labour plus unemployment subsidies- in the different regions. This positive
relationship between wages and unemployment has its origins in Adam Smith and was
formalised by Harris and Todaro (1970), but it is not consistent with the empirical wage
curve literature.
There have been different attempts to solve this puzzle. In fact, there are different
theoretical models that are consistent with this negative relationship between individual
wages and regional unemployment. In this sense, in the literature, two different kinds of
models that predict this negative relationship have been proposed: efficiency wage
models and bargaining models.
First, the justification of the wage curve in the framework of the theory of efficiency
wages is based on the fact that when local unemployment is high, incentives to shirking
are lower and the employer does not have to pay additional wages. According to
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), when there are incentives to shirking and high monitoring
costs, the employer has to pay higher wages to workers to avoid productivity
slowdowns. However, when local unemployment is higher, the probability of finding
alternative employment in case of being dismissed reduces and as a result the employer3
does not have to pay additional wages. As a result, a negative relationship between
wages and local unemployment is predicted.
Second, in the bargaining model, wages are the outcome of a negotiating process
between unions and firms. When unemployment is high, the bargaining power of
workers weakens because the alternative wage that workers face in case of laid-off is
lower than before. Employers are conscious of this fact and try to negotiate lower
wages. As a result of this bargaining process, a negative relationship appears between
local unemployment and wages.
Summarising, at least, two different kind of models have been proposed in the literature
that predict a negative relationship between wages and unemployment (i.e. a wage
curve) as opposite to the theoretical prediction of Harris and Todaro (1970). However, it
is important to remark that these approaches do not necessarily invalidate the model of
Harris and Todaro, but they make it possible to work with the hypothesis that, in the
short term- while migratory flows do not equalize the net advantage in regions-, the
observable relationship between wages and unemployment is negative. On the opposite,
in the long run, regions with high unemployment should be compensated by higher pay.
Back to the empirical literature, apart from the major findings previously mentioned,
there are other results that should be mentioned. On one hand, different authors show
that when not taking into account regional fixed effects, there is a higher probability of
finding a significant coefficient for regional unemployment. The consideration of
regional fixed effect is relevant as wage differences can be not related to unemployment
differences, but to cultural differences or different price levels. So, if these effects are
not considered the elasticity of wages to unemployment will usually be overestimated.
On the other hand, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) present a variety of evidence on
differences in the effect on wages of the unemployment for different kinds of workers or
in different industries. There are different hypotheses that try to shed light on the
variation of the slope of the wage curve across different group of individuals. While the
first explanation is related to how wages are measured, the other two are much more
interesting from an economic point of view.4
A first possible explanation is related to how wages are measured in the considered
equation (Card, 1995). When annual earnings are considered, differences in the cyclical
sensitivity of worked hours can explain differences among groups. As annual earnings
are the product of annual hours and hourly wages, a higher elasticity of certain groups
could be related to this fact. For example, if in a recession the number of hours worked
by women decreases faster than for men (and assuming that hourly wages remains
stable for both), women’s annual wages will decrease faster than men’s while
unemployment for women will increase faster than for men. If this is true, the negative
relationship among unemployment (increasing) and annual wages (decreasing) will
obviously be more intense for women than for men.
A second explanation is related to the intuition behind the previously exposed
bargaining model. When the bargaining power of a group of workers is negligible,
unemployment rates will have great effects on wage determination. In this sense, groups
of workers with higher bargaining power will not take into consideration the evolution
of unemployment rates when negotiating wages. For them, the absolute value of the
coefficient of unemployment on wages will necessarily be lower than in the previous
case.
Last, as Turunen (1998) points out, the variation in the slope of disaggregated wage
curves could generally indicate different responses to local labour market conditions. In
particular, labour market groups that are more protected from the outside labour market
by firing costs of by specific human capital investments will be less responsive to local
unemployment. So, the idea is that if wages in these protected labour markets are
isolated from cyclical shocks, they will be less responsive to local labour market
conditions. This fact means that these groups usually have lowest absolute values for the
elasticity of wages to unemployment. This would explain why wages of senior workers
vary less with current labour market conditions that younger ones, or for example, why
wages of public sector workers are insensitive to local labour market conditions.
Taking into account the literature briefly summarised here, the analysis of the wage-
local-unemployment relationship for the Spanish case is especially relevant due to the
institutional characteristics of its labour market. In 1990, year of reference of the
considered data base, the Spanish labour market was characterised by an intermediate5
collective bargaining system –as most continental European countries- with a reduced
union density (13%), but with a high coverage (76%) (OECD, 1997). It is also
important to highlight that firing costs were high (OECD, 1994, chapter 6). These
features suggest the existence of a high bargaining strength of insiders. Moreover, the
benefit system was quite generous until 1992, especially in terms of the replacement
ratio but also in terms of duration (OECD, 1988). Long-term unemployment represented
about the 53% of total unemployment and the underground economy was quite
important. These data permit to conclude that there were a low search intensity and a
low eligibility of unemployed and, as a result, a very reduced competition for employed
and a reduced pressure on wages. Due to these institutional facts, one can think of a low
elasticity of wages to unemployment or even in the non-existence of a wage curve.
Moreover, the unemployment rate in 1990 was 16.3%, nearly the double of the
unemployment rate in the European Union countries. This data also suggests a low
elasticity as the international evidence show that the curve is flatter when the
unemployment rate is higher.
But, there are other facts that suggest that the result can be the contrary: a higher
elasticity of wages to unemployment. From 1984, fixed-term contracts are introduced in
the Spanish labour market. In 1990, this kind of contracts represented the 30.4% of total
employees. This fact implies a higher job rotation and a higher exposure of workers –
and their wages- to labour market conditions.
It is interesting, then, to test which is the dominant effect -institutional rigidities versus
contractual flexibility- and to analyse the possible existence of a dual labour market
between these two collectives of workers: those with fixed-term contracts and those
with permanent contracts.
3. Data
The data used in this paper are based on the Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares
(Family Budget Survey) carried out by the INE (the Spanish Institute of Statistics) for the
second quarter of 1990 to the first quarter of 1991. The basic purpose of this survey was
the study of the expenditure made on goods and services by Spanish families.6
Nevertheless, the span of the statistical operation was used to collect information of
diverse types about Spanish families. In this additional information we found
information about personal and job characteristics and wages, among others. The
availability of this broad individualised information, and the fact that this information is
at the provincial level suggested its use in this paper. The earnings variable that comes
from this data is the annual incomes from paid employment. To avoid the inclusion of
inaccurated data, we have only used information about the 16.949 persons who worked
in non-agricultural industries and all the additional necessary information was provided.
It is important to remark that the survey does not provide information about the kind of
contract of workers (fixed term or permanent contract).
Data about the average unemployment rate between the second quarter of 1990 and the
first quarter of 1991 have been taken from Encuesta de Población Activa (Labour Force
Survey) which was carried out by the INE on 63.000 Spanish homes.
The regional detail considered in this paper is the provincia (NUTS-III) as it is the
lowest level of regional aggregation for both databases. As it will be seen in the next
section, we have also used information about unemployment rates by gender and for
different activity sectors keeping the same level of territorial detail.
4. Econometric results
The methodological approach used in this paper is the usual in this literature. In
particular, the logarithm of annual wages is regressed on a number of control variables
related to personal and job characteristics and the unemployment rate. A detailed list of
control variables is presented in annex B and full results for every model are available
from the authors on request. In table 1 in annex A, replication of the different initial
specifications for the wage curve as proposed by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) are
presented. To test for non-linearities, this specification also includes two different non-
linear specifications. In particular, the following models are considered:
• The natural logarithm of the unemployment rate (model 1)
• The logarithm of the unemployment rate and its cube (model 2)
• The unemployment rate entered as a level (model 3)7
• The unemployment and its squared (model 4)
• The inverse of the unemployment rate (model 5)
In model 1, the coefficient on the natural logarithm of the unemployment rate is
negative and significant as expected with a magnitude close to –0.1, the value found for
most countries. Results using the natural logarithm of unemployment or the
unemployment rate (model 3) are similar when values of the elasticities are considered.
When considered jointly, cubic (model 2) and quadratic (model 3) terms, include to test
for non-linearities in the wage curve, are not significant. For this reason, the natural
logarithm of the unemployment rate will be considered the standard specification in the
rest of the paper (as in Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994). Moreover, this specification
has the advantage that the coefficient on unemployment is directly interpretable as the
elasticity of wages to unemployment.
Although the previous results support the existence of a wage curve for the Spanish
economy, it is important to notice that these models did not include regional and
sectoral fixed effects. As it has been exposed in section 2, these variables are relevant
for the analysis as among certain regions, wage differences can be not related to
unemployment differences, but to the different industrial structures, cultural differences
or different price levels. So, if these effects are not considered the elasticity of wages to
unemployment could be overestimated. Table 2 presents the results for the logarithm of
the unemployment rate when including regional and sectoral dummy variables (see
annex C). In general, the coefficient for the unemployment is still negative but not
significant at usual levels.
However, these results cannot be interpreted as evidence of the inexistence of a wage
curve for Spain. As in Groot et al. (1992), we refine the measure of the unemployment
rate using three different definitions of the regional unemployment rates:
• Unemployment rates by provincia (NUTS-III) and gender
• Unemployment rates by provincia and activity sector
• Unemployment rates by autonomous community (NUTS-II) and age
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These refined unemployment rates are probably a better indicator of the relevant labour
market conditions which the individual faces than the regional unemployment rates are.
Results when unemployment rates by provincia and gender are considered are shown in
table 3. Different models in this table show a significant and negative relationship
between provincial-gender unemployment and individual wages. This relationship is
robust to the inclusion of regional and sectoral dummies. The included regional
dummies correspond to the next level of territorial aggregation, NUTS-II, and the
equivalence between NUTS-III regions (provincias) and NUTS-II regions (autonomous
community) is shown in appendix C. In reference to sectoral dummies, nine different
sectors are being considered as survey data do not offer more detailed information.
Sector description is also shown in appendix C.
In table 4, a wage curve only for men is estimated. The coefficient for unemployment is
negative and significant even when regional and sectoral dummies are included. It is
slightly higher than in regressions with aggregated unemployment.
In table 5, the results for women are presented. In each model, the coefficient on
unemployment is negative and significant. Its magnitude is surprisingly high in models
2 and 4 where regional and sectoral dummies are included. In fact, the high magnitude
of the coefficient of the wage curve for women contrasts with the value for men (more
than five times higher). Opposite to the evidence of other countries (for example,
Janssens and Konings, 1998 for Belgium), this fact might indicate that the Spanish
female labour market is more competitive than the male one. Regions with higher
unemployment rates for women are also the regions where lower wages are paid as
there is much more competition for jobs. There are three possible explanations of why
this holds for women but not so intensely for men.
A first reason is related with the fact that information about wages is refereed to the
whole year. As the unemployment rate is higher for women (24.2%) than for men
(12.0%), the probability for women of being unemployed during some months of the
year is higher. These months of unemployment imply lower annual earnings. There is,
then, an inverse relationship between unemployment rates and annual earnings for
women that can overestimate the elasticity of the wage curve.9
The second reason of this highest elasticity in the wage curve for women is related with
the highest importance of fixed term contracts among women. While in 1990 the value
for men was 28.2%, for women was 35.2%. The highest rotation of the women labour
force in the Spanish labour market is probably the cause of a higher exposure to the
market competitive pressure and a higher sensibility of wages to unemployment.
A third explanation is based in the lowest bargaining power of women. Most employed
women work in industries such as textile and shoes (62% of employees of this sector
were women), retail sales (49.6% of employees), health services (68.2%), personal
services (77.3%) and domestic services (77.3%). In these industries, firms are small and
they operate in more competitive sectors and some of them also face strong demand
fluctuations. In these activities, fixed term contracts and the rotation of labour force is
high while union strength is very low. All these conditions generate a high sensibility of
wages to labour market conditions.
It is also important to remark that the value for the aggregated elasticity of wages to
unemployment (-0.057) is smaller than the value for men (-0.066) and women (-0.360)
separately. A possible explanation is that when considering more relevant labour market
conditions, the competition among unemployed is appreciated much more clearly and
this increases the effect of unemployment rates on wages. This fact is common to other
regional analysis of labour markets (López-Tamayo, 2000).
When refining the measure of unemployment using unemployment rates by region
(provincia) and activity sector, the coefficient is negative, significant and with a
magnitude of –0.124 even when regional and sectoral dummies are included (table 6).
In tables 7, 8 and 9, the results of estimating wage curves for individual who develop
their professional activity in manufacturing, building and services sectors are presented.
It has not been possible to obtain more detailed results in terms of activity sectors
because data on unemployment at a provincial level is only provided for agriculture,
manufacturing, building and services. The results in tables 7 and 9 show that there is no
clear evidence of a wage curve for manufacturing and services sectors when regional10
and sectoral dummies are included in the specification. However, as it can be seen in
table 8, there is clear evidence for a wage curve for the building sector.
The same arguments could be highlighted again. This is a sector with a high proportion
(53.6%) of fixed term contracts given the characteristics of the building activity. This
could be the reason because the process of wage setting is more competitive than in
other sectors, as employment opportunities depend clearly of the demand evolution. In
consequence, wages are low when unemployment is high and they increase when
unemployment is low. Other relevant feature is the following: there is a specific labour
market for the building sector, but may be more than one for manufacturing and for the
services sector
4.
Last, the results obtained when unemployment rates by autonomous community and age
are considered, are presented in table 10. The considered unemployment rates
distinguish between four age-groups: workers between 16 and 19 years old, between 20
and 24, 25-54 and, last, 55-65 with a regional detail corresponding to the autonomous
community (see final note 3). From table 10, it can be seen that the coefficient of
unemployment is negative, significant and with a magnitude of –0.133. Again, the value
is higher than the coefficient when using unemployment rates by provincia and gender
(-0.057).
In tables 11, 12, 13 and 14, the results of estimating wage curves for the different age
groups are shown. First of all, it is important to notice that for every age group, the
coefficient on unemployment is negative and significant after including sectoral
dummies. Second, there are great differences in terms of the magnitude of the
coefficient among age groups. While younger workers’ wages are more responsive to
regional unemployment, the elasticity of wages to unemployment for older workers is
lower. For workers between 16-19 and 20-24 there are no significant differences in
terms of the value of the coefficient on unemployment (-0.264 for both). On the
opposite, for workers between 25 and 54 years old the value is very close to the usual
value of –0.1 and for oldest workers the value is lower to that (-0.062). The justification
of this result is quite obvious. Young workers are contracted for fixed terms (69.2% of
them) and have a high rotation while this is not the case for workers older than 55.
Moreover, firing costs are calculated considering workers’ tenure, so it is usually more11
expensive to dismiss older workers as they have a high tenure. Also, if older workers
become unemployed, they have benefits during a long time period and when finished,
under certain conditions, they can access early retirement. So, the pressure that older
unemployed workers can exert on available jobs (and wages) is minimal. Again the
interpretation of the results is similar to the previous refinements of the unemployment
measures: when labour market conditions are properly specified, more competition
among workers and unemployed imply a greater response of wages to unemployment
To summarise the obtained results, we find evidence supporting a wage curve for the
Spanish economy with an elasticity of individual wages to regional unemployment of –
0.06 for male and women taken together. When using unemployment rates of region
and activity sector, this value increases up to –0.124 and, last, using region and age
unemployment rates, the value is –0.133. It seems, then, that when trying to refine the
measurement of the unemployment rate affecting the individual, the value of the
elasticity increases substantially as competition in labour markets is better considered.
5. Conclusions
The principal finding of this paper is the existence of a wage curve for the Spanish
economy with an elasticity of –0.06. This result would be consistent with the idea that
in presence of high unemployment rates, the wage curve is flatter. This would imply
that from certain levels of unemployment, a higher number of unemployed does not
affect wage setting. The results are also consistent with the idea that in the nineties, the
Spanish labour market was less flexible than in other European labour markets.
Moreover, the available evidence for the Spanish labour market from macroeconomic
wage equations at a national level have also detected a low elasticity of wages to
unemployment (Layard et al., 1991, chapter 9; Viñals and Jimeno, 1997, and Sanromá
and Ramos, 1998, among others).
A second interesting fact that can be highlighted from the results is the relevance of
using a refined measure of unemployment when analysing the relationship between
regional unemployment and individual wages. In this sense, the value of the elasticity of
wages to unemployment increases when the considered unemployment rate better
approximates the relevant unemployment rate for the individual. This fact could imply12
that labour markets are overisolated as there is a few mobility among areas, activity
sectors, qualifications and groups. And, moreover, there is a clearly duality between
workers with permanent contacts and those with fixed term contracts.
Last, the results show that the labour markets of female and young workers are
substantially more competitive than the male and older workers labour market. The
elasticity of individual wages to unemployment is substantially higher for this kind of
workers. The results suggest the existence of a deep duality in the Spanish labour
market. There is a primary labour market formed by male workers of medium age, with
permanent contracts and with high levels of specific human capital. These workers’
wages would be much less influenced by labour market conditions.
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7. Final notes
1 Although Canziani (1997) provides evidence for the relationship between individual wages
and unemployment rates for Spain, these unemployment rates are not regional but by gender
and age group.
2 The unemployment rate is considered as a potential explanatory variable of interprovincial
wage differences in Spain.
3 It has not been possible to keep the same level of territorial analysis due to data availability.
So, for this reason, we have considered the immediately next level of territorial aggregation,
which is the Autonomous Community (NUTS-II).
4 In 1990, the 10.9% of total employees worked in the building sector, the 29.8% worked in the
manufacturing sector and the left 59.2% in the services sector.13
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ANNEX A. Wage curve estimates
Table 1
OLS estimation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5














Inv Provincial U 1.225
(8.447)
Intercept 13.173 12.928 12.976 13.034 12.755
Adjusted R2 0.419 0.419 0.418 0.419 0.418
N 16949 16949 16949 16949 16949
F 382.371 371.080 382.560 371.173 380.835
Table 2
OLS estimation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3






Intercept 12.858 13.149 12.848
Regional dummies 16 - 16
Sectoral dummies - 8 8
Adjusted R2 0.424 0.421 0.426
N 16949 16949 16949
F 260.400 309.658 225.41015
Table 3
OLS estimation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4








Intercept 13.030 13.014 13.007 12.975
Regional dummies - 48 - 48
Sectoral dummies - - 8 8
Adjusted R2 0.419 0.431 0.422 0.434
N 16949 16949 16949 16949
F 381.107 159.975 308.602 146.811
Table 4
OLS estimation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4








Intercept 13.181 13.163 13.138 13.101
Regional dummies - 48 - 48
Sectoral dummies - - 8 8
Adjusted R2 0.399 0.414 0.406 0.420
N 11498 11498 11498 11498
F 247.555 102.095 202.476 95.061
Table 5
OLS estimation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4








Intercept 12.700 13.752 12.727 13.727
Regional dummies - 48 - 49
Sectoral dummies - - 8 8
Adjusted R2 0.358 0.383 0.361 0.385
N 5451 5451 5451 5451
F 102.446 42.684 81.884 39.06816
Table 6
OLS estimation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4








Intercept 13.125 13.072 13.107 13.085
Regional dummies - 48 - 48
Sectoral dummies - - 8 8
Adjusted R2 0.419 0.429 0.422 0.432
N 16949 16949 16949 16949
F 383.946 158.610 310.866 145.779
Table 7
OLS estimation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4








Intercept 13.146 12.746 13.066 12.677
Regional dummies - 16 - 16
Sectoral dummies - - 3 3
Adjusted R2 0.429 0.437 0.434 0.441
N 4734 4734 4734 4734
F 116.030 79.175 107.929 75.800
Table 8
OLS estimation Model 1 Model 2





Regional dummies - 16




OLS estimation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4








Intercept 13.056 12.923 13.054 12.930
Regional dummies - 16 - 16
Sectoral dummies - - 3 3
Adjusted R2 0.444 0.449 0.445 0.449
N 10317 10317 10317 10317
F 275.699 184.100 252.081 173.67217
Table 10
OLS estimation Model 1 Model 2





Sectoral dummies - 8




OLS estimation Model 1 Model 2





Sectoral dummies - 8




OLS estimation Model 1 Model 2





Sectoral dummies - 8




OLS estimation Model 1 Model 2





Sectoral dummies - 8




OLS estimation Model 1 Model 2





Sectoral dummies - 8
Adjusted R2 0.448 0.454
N 1686 1686
F 43.767 36.07018





Levels of study Schooling years Description
0 years Illiterate-without studies
Elementary 6 years Primary education
9 years EGB or equivalent
Medium 11 years Technical studies, first degree (FP-1)
12 years BUP or equivalent
previous to high 13 years COU
14 years Technical studies, second degree (FP-2)
High 16 years (sch8) Medium university studies or equivalent
18 years (sch9) High university studies or equivalent




Law and science professionals and technicians, teachers
Artistic and sports professionals and technicians
Public sector managers and officers
Office, transport and communications services managers
Administrative services workers




Shop managers, foremen and persons in charge
Extraction of minerals industry workers
Elaboration of minerals industry workers
Chemical industry workers
Food, wood, clothes, shoes, furniture, etc. Industry workers
Electric and electronic technicians




ANNEX C. Territorial and activity sector dummies
Autonomous community Provinces Autonomous community Provinces









Teruel Comunidad Valenciana Alicante
Zaragoza Castellón de la Plana
Asturias Asturias Valencia
Baleares Baleares Extremadura Badajoz
Canarias Palmas (Las) Cáceres
Sta. Cruz Tenerife Galicia Coruña (La)
Cantabria Cantabria Lugo





Segovia País Vasco Alava
Soria Guipúzcoa
Valladolid Vizcaya
Zamora Rioja (La) Rioja (La)
Energy and water
Extraction and non-energetic minerals transformation, chemistry industry
Metallic elaboration industries, precision mechanics Manufacturing
Other manufacturing industries
Building Building
Commerce, restaurants and hotels, repairs
Transport and communications
Financial institutions, insurance, services to firms and rents Services
Other services